Keep on Truckin\u27, Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs by Bindman, Boris
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 72 Issue 1 Article 7 
8-20-2015 
Keep on Truckin', Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs 
Boris Bindman 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, bindmanb@wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Boris Bindman, Keep on Truckin', Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Challenge Regulatory 
Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 136 (2015), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
wlulr-online/vol72/iss1/7 
This Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
136 
Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the 
Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to 
TNCs   
Boris Bindman* 
Professor Kish Parella, Advisor 
John Byrne, Student Advisor 
Abstract 
We are witnessing a revolution in the way we get around, if 
only we glance up from our phones. “Techies” and suit-clad 
professionals alike use their phones to request rides from tuxedo-
attired professional chauffeurs in luxury vehicles, as well as from 
part-time nonprofessionals using their “daily-driver” to make some 
extra cash. It is indisputable that Transportation Network 
Companies (TNCs)—like Uber and Lyft—are providing unique 
alternatives to taxis and conventional charter-car carriers while 
simultaneously paving the way for a new era in transportation.  
“App-based” car-for-hire platforms, said to be the cause of 
market “disruption,” have met unwavering resistance from 
industry competitors, advocacy groups, and government regulators 
arguing that these services are illegal, unsafe, and competing 
unfairly. Consequently, TNCs have often faced outright bans, 
anachronistic regulations, and numerous legal hurdles. Whether 
the rationales for regulations and bans have been pretexts for 
protectionism and resistance to change, or legitimate expressions 
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of concern for safety and fair business practices, it is clear that 
they are responses to TNCs supplying a demand for easy, 
affordable, and reliable transportation. 
This Note examines whether the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine bars certain types of bans or regulations of TNC 
platforms. Though TNCs have not shown an eagerness to litigate 
challenges to their operations, this avenue of defense—a road once 
treaded by trucking and railroad companies—remains open to 
them. TNCs may thus look to revive the dormant Commerce 
Clause in the context of transportation regulations to challenge 
local limitations on their operations. 
Importantly, this Note does not argue that any and all safety 
or labor concerns offered in efforts to regulate or limit TNC 
operations are unfounded or that invalidation of well-intentioned 
attempts to regulate for these concerns on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds will somehow take care of them. Genuine concerns 
do exist, but the only way to seriously and judiciously confront 
them is through even-handed and constitutional legislation that 
recognizes that TNCs are parked and here to stay. 
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I. Introduction 
Getting a Lyft or calling an Uber has become as conspicuous 
as the decades-old gesture of raising a hand to hail a cab. Young 
“techies” and suit-clad professionals alike pull out their phones in 
front of office buildings and bars, requesting a ride and seeing 
their driver’s car, user rating, and estimated time of arrival 
instantly on their screens.1 With a GPS-equipped smartphone, 
one can find a ride across town or a personal chauffeur for the 
day with the touch of a button in hundreds of cities worldwide.2 
                                                                                                     
 1. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (explaining 
the application’s features on the website home page) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Where is Uber Currently Available?, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Feb. 1 2015) (indicating that as of 
December 16, 2014, the service was available in fifty-three countries and more 
than 200 cities worldwide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Cities We’re In, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/cities (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
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By affording riders the option of either getting a ride from a 
tuxedo-attired chauffeur in a luxury sport-utility vehicle or 
limousine, or from a nonprofessional in their “daily-driver,” 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs)3 are offering unique 
alternatives to taxis.4 It would be no exaggeration to say that we 
are witnessing a revolution in the way we get around, if we only 
glance up from our phones.5  
                                                                                                     
(noting that Lyft currently operates in over sixty U.S. cities) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See Tomio Geron, California PUC Proposes Legalizing Ride-Sharing 
From Startups Lyft, SideCar, Uber, FORBES (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/07/30/california-puc-proposes-
legalizing-ride-sharing-companies-lyft-sidecar-uber/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) 
(noting that TNCs are companies that use online-enabled, smartphone 
application platforms to connect drivers and passengers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See Suzanne Stathatos, Debunking the Pink Mustache: Taxi Alternative 
Lyft Launches in San Francisco, SF WKLY (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2012/08/31/debunking-the-pink-mustaches-
taxi-alternative-lyft-launches-in-san-francisco (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(reporting that Lyft has described itself as offering an iPhone or Android 
application “that lets you rent a ‘friend with a car’”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); John P. Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About 
Uber, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3556741/uber/ (last visited Feb. 1, 
2015) (reporting that Uber offers several different levels of service, allowing 
passengers to choose between a ride in the likes of a Toyota Prius, all the way 
up to top-of-the-line posh options like Porsches and BMWs, with luxury SUVs, 
Lincoln Town Cars, and limousines in between) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 5. See Marvin Ammori, Can the FTC Save Uber?, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2013, 
12:15 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar
_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.single.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(“Uber, SideCar, and Lyft are not simply a fad—they are the first indications of 
a transportation revolution now receiving considerable venture investment.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Don Jergler, Transportation 
Network Companies, Uber Gap Worries Insurers, INS. J. (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2014/01/10/316839.htm (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that Uber has “entered more than 60 markets” and is 
purportedly “generating $200 million a year in revenue beyond what it pays to 
drivers”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The Rise of the 
Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-
sharing-economy (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (explaining that the “sharing 
economy” allows for a type of business built on the sharing of resources so that 
consumers can access goods when needed and “act as an ad hoc taxi service [or] 
car-hire firm . . . as and when it suits them”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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Originally conceived as a response to consumer 
dissatisfaction with taxi monopolies,6 Uber, Lyft, and other TNCs 
are paving the way for a new era in transportation by disrupting 
the traditional car-for-hire service industry.7 TNCs create mobile 
phone applications that facilitate peer-to-peer car-for-hire 
services by connecting passengers who need a ride to drivers who 
have a car.8 Though notable differences exist among the 
companies’ services,9 they all utilize smart-phone technology to 
                                                                                                     
 6. See MARK W. FRANKENA & PAUL A. PAUTLER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION 155 (1984), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/economic-analysis-
taxicab-regulation/233832.pdf (noting that the deliberate insulation of taxi 
companies from competition by local taxi commissions that colluded to limit the 
number of available licenses has resulted in dismal taxi service across the 
nation and has fleeced residents). 
 7. See Clayton Christensen, Key Concepts—Disruptive Innovation, 
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/ (last visited February 20, 
2015) (describing a disruptive innovation as an innovation that helps create a 
new market and value network by disrupting an existing market and value 
network, displacing an earlier technology, and improving a product or service in 
ways that the market does not expect) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 8. See Patrick Hoge, Lyft and Sidecar Replace Voluntary Donations with 
Set Prices, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2013/11/lyft-sidecar-uber-ride-
sharing.html?page=all (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (explaining that these TNC 
services connect riders through smartphone applications to private individuals 
who give rides in privately-owned vehicles) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Maya Kosoff, 2 Lawsuits Could Dramatically Alter the 
Business Model for Uber and Lyft, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-business-models-threatened-by-
lawsuits-2015-1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (noting that drivers utilize their own 
vehicles and are classified as independent contractors, though pending litigation 
seeks to reclassify drivers as employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 9. See Evan Dashevsky, Uber vs. Lyft: Which Ride-Sharing App Is Best for 
You?, PC MAG. (Nov. 18, 2014, 4:08 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2472358,00.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(outlining the differences between Lyft and Uber’s services app-based, ride-for-
hire services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For example, 
“UberX” and Lyft are lower cost options, allowing nonprofessional drivers to use 
their personal vehicles with no requirement that drivers obtain a car-for-hire 
license. See id. (describing the lower-cost services UberX and Lyft and how they 
operate). Alternatively, “Uber Black”—Uber’s premium option—offers luxury 
sedans and SUVs whose drivers are required to maintain the same municipal 
and state licenses as other livery (for-hire) car services. See Pullen, supra note 4 
(explaining Uber’s ride-for-hire platform).  
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connect available drivers with riders seeking a ride, using 
algorithms that factor time and distance in their fare calculation 
much like a taxi meter.10  
Such “app-based” car-for-hire platforms have met determined 
resistance from industry competitors, advocacy groups, and 
government regulators who argue that these services are illegal, 
unsafe, and competing unfairly.11 Much of this debate has 
centered on whether these services amount to illegal taxicab 
operations or whether this model of transportation is in a class of 
its own, incapable of classification under outdated regulatory 
frameworks.12  
                                                                                                     
 10. See Dashevsky, supra note 9 (relaying that each ride has a base fare, on 
top of which a per-minute and per-mile charge is added, based on an algorithm 
that varies by city and by the particular level of demand for the service at the 
time of day).  
 11. See, e.g., Michael Cabanatuan, S.F. Taxi Owners, Cabbies Join Forces 
Against Uber, Lyft, Others, SFGATE, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-
taxi-owners-cabbies-join-forces-against-5773407.php (last updated Sept. 23, 
2014, 8:10 AM) (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (noting that app-based rides, unlike 
taxis, are not serving all neighborhoods, providing accessible services to the 
disabled, or complying with air-quality requirements) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Christian Hill, Eugene Tells Uber to Cease 
Operations, REGISTER-GUARD (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://registerguard.com/rg/news/local/32239677-75/eugene-says-uber-operating-
illegally-warns-drivers.html.csp# (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (explaining that 
Eugene city officials find Uber to be operating illegally because Uber has not 
obtained an operating license under the city’s “public passenger vehicle” 
regulations) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); Tracey Lien & 
Russell Mitchell, Uber Sued Over Unlawful Business Practices; Lyft Settles, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-
tn-uber-lyft-20141209-story.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that “Los 
Angeles and San Francisco district attorneys filed a consumer protection lawsuit 
against Uber on Tuesday [Dec. 9, 2014], alleging that the popular ride-hailing 
company misleads consumers about the service’s safety, overcharges them and 
thumbs its nose at the law,” while Lyft settled similar lawsuits) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Kale Williams, Uber Sued Over Girl’s Death 
in S.F.: Family Says Firm’s App Violates Distracted-Driving Laws, SFGATE, 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-
5178921.php (last updated Jan. 28, 2014, 12:42 PM) (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(alleging, in a wrongful death action, that the phone-based interface that drivers 
use to find fares contributed to the death of six year-old pedestrian Sofia [Liu] 
who was struck and killed by an Uber service provider) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See RDU Cites Ride-Sharing Services as Illegal Taxis, WRAL.COM 
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.wral.com/rdu-cites-ride-sharing-services-as-illegal-
taxis/14019999/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (reporting that police at Raleigh-
Durham International Airport, treating Uber and Lyft as illegal taxis, have 
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Consequently, TNCs have often faced outright bans, 
anachronistic regulations, and numerous legal hurdles.13 In 
Miami, anti-Lyft sting operations resulted in drivers facing hefty 
fines and impoundment of their personal vehicles.14 In 
Washington, D.C., where Uber initially faced an outright ban, the 
city council, in its first attempt at regulating Uber, proposed a 
scheme by which the fare amount had to be at least five times 
that which a taxicab charged for the same ride.15 San Francisco, 
the birthplace of Uber and Lyft, vacillated between allowing their 
unfettered operation and holding aspects of their operations 
                                                                                                     
been citing TNC drivers for not complying with airport permit regulations) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, CPUC Cites Passenger 
Carriers Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber $20,000 Each for Public Safety Violations (Nov. 
14, 2012) (declaring that the California Public Utility Commission issued 
$20,000 citations to Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber for operating illegally as charter-
party carriers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lori Aratani, 
Virginia Officials Order Uber, Lyft to Stop Operating in the State, WASH. POST 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-
gridlock/wp/2014/06/05/virginia-officials-order-uber-lyft-to-stop-operating-in-the-
state (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (maintaining that the app-based services were 
operating without proper permits, Richard D. Holcomb, commissioner of the 
Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, sent a cease and desist letter to both 
Uber and Lyft) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ellen Huet, 
SF, LA District Attorneys Sue Uber, Settle with Lyft Over ‘Misleading’ Business 
Violations, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2014, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/09/sf-la-district-attorneys-sue-
uber-and-lyft-over-misleading-business-violations (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) 
(alleging multiple business violations in California’s suit that focuses on the 
companies’ messaging to its riders as well as their airport practices) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 14. See Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft 
Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/miami-cops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyft-
drivers-2014-6 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (“The county had been fining Lyft 
drivers up to $2,000 each for failing to get a chauffeur registration and for 
operating a for-hire vehicle without a valid for-hire license—both requirements 
for cabbies and limo operators.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 15. See James Fallows, Uber vs. Washington, D.C.: This Is Insane, 
ATLANTIC (July 10, 2012, 9:33 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/uber-vs-washington-dc-
this-is-insane/259614/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (reporting that the regulation 
sponsored by Councilmember Mary Cheh proposed that in exchange for 
approval to operate in the District, Uber “sedans” would be required to charge a 
minimum of five times the “drop rate” for taxicabs) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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illegal—eventually deferring to the California Public Utilities 
Commission for a coherent approach to regulation.16 Until San 
Francisco International Airport recently began allowing TNCs to 
operate at its terminals, every airport across the country 
maintained bans, enforced with various degrees of vigor and 
success.17 Whether the rationales for regulations and bans have 
been pretexts for protectionism and resistance to change, or 
legitimate expressions of concern for safety and fair business 
practices, it is undeniable that they are responses to TNCs 
supplying a demand for easy, affordable, and reliable 
transportation.18 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Larry Downes, Lessons From Uber: Why Innovation and Regulation 
Don’t Mix, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-uber-why-
innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (noting that 
regulatory bans and stiff penalties have been lifted, with attending promises to 
liberalize, pending Public Utility Commission agreements with TNCs) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See Patrick Kulp, San Francisco Airport First in the U.S. to Reach 
Deals with Uber, Lyft, MASHABLE (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/10/21/san-francisco-airport-uber-lyft/ (last visited Feb. 
1, 2015) (“Uber, Lyft and Sidecar drivers will now be legally allowed to pick up 
and drop off passengers at San Francisco International Airport, thanks to deals 
the airport just signed with the three companies.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Jessica Kwong, Lyft, Uber Secure SFO Deal, SF 
EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/lyft-joins-
sidecar-in-securing-sfo-deal/Content?oid=2909712 (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(“Uber and Lyft have signed deals to operate legally at San Francisco 
International Airport . . . the first agreement of its kind for any airport in 
California.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. See Jeff Stone, Uber, Lyft Almost Always Cheaper than Traditional 
Taxis, Researchers Find, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-lyft-almost-always-cheaper-traditional-taxis-
researchers-find-1703802 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) (according to a recent 
market study, “[c]ustomers riding with Uber and Lyft will spend less than they 
would on the same ride with a taxi almost all the time, except in the hours that 
the transportation companies have surge pricing in effect”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Gwynedd Stuart, Can Chicago’s Taxi 
Industry Survive the Rideshare Revolution?, CHI. READER (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/rideshare-chicago-uber-lyft-uberx-taxi-
industry-cab-drivers-extinct/Content?oid=15165161 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) 
(noting that “Uber and its ilk have made hailing a ride . . . and paying a 
reasonably low fare, as easy as a couple of swipes on a smartphone screen”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Demonstrating a clear shift towards a new transportation 
landscape,19 TNCs are blowing through all of the yellow and red 
lights that have presented roadblocks to their operations.20 After 
evading classification and regulation under existing regimes, 
Uber and Lyft have themselves sought to exploit the logic of 
regulatory capture.21 These tactics evince a broader strategy to 
avoid costly litigation and instead work to develop a cooperative 
regulatory climate.22 In combination with growing recognition of 
their service’s utility and benefits to consumers,23 these strategic 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Tomio Geron, AirBnB and the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing 
Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-
rise-of-the-share-economy/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (noting that the sharing 
concept has created markets out of things that would not have been considered 
monetizable assets before and that this new paradigm is here to stay) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See, e.g., Alexa Vaughn, Ride-Share Cars: Illegal, and All Over Seattle, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 16, 2014), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021206141_ridesharingappsxml.html 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (noting that the drivers and vehicles with Lyft, 
Sidecar, and UberX are not licensed with the city of Seattle, and are thereby 
illegal, but that has not prompted the city to stop the increasingly popular ride-
sharing services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. See, e.g., Ryan Lawler, Mr. Kalanick Goes to Washington: How Uber 
Won in DC, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/04/mr-
kalanick-goes-to-washington-how-uber-won-in-dc/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) 
(noting that for a startup that had “previously eschewed politics,” Uber is 
learning how to play the game—retaining the services of Jerry Hallisey, a 
former California Transportation Commissioner, being a case in point) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. See id. (pointing out that Uber has worked closely with D.C. lawmakers 
to craft favorable regulations, which it hopes other cities will seek to model). 
 23. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, With Uber, Less Reason to Own a Car, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/technology/personaltech/with-ubers-cars-
maybe-we-dont-need-our-own.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (maintaining 
that ride-sharing has become a viable alternative to car ownership) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Emily Badger, Are Uber and Lyft 
Responsible for Reducing DUIs?, WASH. POST (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/10/are-uber-and-
lyft-responsible-for-reducing-duis/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (arguing that 
services such as Uber and Lyft may be contributing to a reduction in drunk 
driving and DUIs by giving the bar-hopping demographic a better way to get 
home at night) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Carolyn 
Said, Uber, Lyft, Sidecar Try Carpool Service, SFGATE, 
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Uber-Lyft-Sidecar-try-carpool-service-
5672983.php (last updated Aug. 6, 2014, 5:58 PM) (last visited Nov. 3, 2014) 
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maneuvers have led TNCs to become staples in the 
transportation landscapes of major metropolitan areas and sleepy 
suburbs alike.24 In light of this reality, an ever-increasing number 
of state and local governments are beginning to find creative 
ways to accommodate and regulate TNCs to realize their benefits 
while simultaneously protecting the interests of safety and 
revenue.25 Others, however, have persisted in maintaining bans.26  
                                                                                                     
(“The benefits of fewer cars on the road are obvious: less congestion, fewer 
emissions, cheaper costs, reduced parking hassles.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 24. See Sean Doogan, As Uber and Its Ilk Expand, Cities Like Anchorage 
Struggle to Regulate the ‘Sharing Economy’, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 19, 
2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20141019/uber-and-its-ilk-expand-cities-
anchorage-struggle-regulate-sharing-economy (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting 
Uber’s explosive growth, both in terms of the ever-expanding number of cities it 
serves and its climbing worth) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 25. See Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to 
Passenger Carriers, Ridesharing & New Online-Enabled Transp. Servs., D. 14-
10-016, 2013 WL 5488494, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2013) (establishing California as the 
first state to provide a regulatory framework for TNCs); Jesse Paul, UberX Joins 
Lyft in Offering Ride-Share Service to Denver Airport, DENVER POST, 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27043840/denver-international-airport-
begin-allowing-uber-operate-at (last updated Dec. 2, 2014, 1:23 AM) (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2015) (announcing that the Denver International Airport will begin 
allowing services like UberX and Lyft to operate at the main terminal) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Aman Batheja, Uber, Lyft Rolling Forward, But Uncertainty 
Lingers, TEX. TRIB. (June 10, 2014), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2014/06/10/uber-lyft-target-texas-cities-despite-
unfriendly-r (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (explaining that TNCs are illegal under 
Austin’s current city transportation code and therefore banned) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sheldon S. Shafer, Uber and Lyft Pickups 
Banned from Airport, COURIER-J. (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/local/2014/11/26/uber-lyft-pickups-banned-
airport/19545401 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (reporting that the Regional Airport 
Authority has advised that Uber and Lyft drivers who work for the ride-sharing 
programs cannot pick up passengers at Louisville International Airport) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Jared Shelly, City Council 
to PPA: Legalize Lyft and Uber, PHILA. BUS. J., 
http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2015/01/30/city-council-to-ppa-
legalize-lyft-and-uber.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2015, 3:01 PM) (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2015) (noting Philadelphia’s fractured regulatory landscape, as the City 
Council has introduced a resolution urging the state legislature to make the 
services legal pursuant to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s 
approval for TNC operations in the state, despite the Philadelphia Parking 
Authority’s ban on TNCs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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This Note examines whether the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine bars certain types of bans or regulations of TNC 
platforms.27 Though TNCs have not shown an eagerness to 
litigate challenges to their operations, this avenue of defense 
remains open—a road once treaded by trucking companies.28 
Although Uber has raised a dormant Commerce Clause challenge 
to the application of California law to drivers outside of 
California,29 such challenges have not been mounted against 
efforts to regulate or thwart TNC operations generally.30 While 
Congress retains authority to regulate in this area,31 it likely will 
not, as most TNC roadway regulations appear to concern matters 
within the realm of states’ police powers.32 TNCs may thus look to 
revive the dormant Commerce Clause in the context of roadway 
regulations to challenge local limitations on their operations.33 
Rather than having to fight to establish themselves in each new 
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra Part VI (discussing whether certain TNC bans or regulations 
are constitutionally impermissible by analogizing to application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine in the transportation cases).  
 28. See infra Part V.B (discussing highway and railroad regulations 
examined by the Supreme Court in light of the dormant Commerce Clause’s 
prohibition on unduly burdening interstate commerce).  
 29. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 
6354534, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013) (noting that Uber argued against the 
application of California law to members of a putative class who utilize the app 
outside of the state).   
 30. See infra Part VI (noting that TNCs have yet to invoke the dormancy 
doctrine to resist regulatory hurdles, but that such challenges are arguably 
viable).  
 31. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) 
(acknowledging that Congress may regulate the use of the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as activities having a 
substantial relation to commerce interstate).   
 32. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (noting that states retain 
the authority to regulate within their territory for the betterment of safety, 
health, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants). But see Ammori, supra 
note 5 (noting that the FTC’s power to regulate interstate commerce is just as 
broad as Congress’s, and just as it regulated local taxi markets by challenging 
anticompetitive practices, it could similarly regulate TNCs because interstate 
travelers take Ubers to and from airports when they fly across state lines). 
Further, TNCs such as Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar are “California-based technology 
companies competing in multiple states,” and thereby have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce. Id. 
 33. See infra Part VI (discussing the potential advantages of challenging 
certain archetypical regulations and bans). 
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market, TNCs may be able to eradicate certain categories of 
regulatory barriers altogether by successfully challenging just 
one such regulation that is archetypical of other “types” of 
regulations.34 
 To maintain a grounded analysis, cognizant of the seemingly 
unpredictable application of the doctrine,35 this Note examines 
TNCs in light of the United States Supreme Court’s articulation 
of the dormant Commerce Clause in the “transportation” cases.36 
The Court’s application of the doctrine in response to state 
attempts to regulate highways—particularly in the wake of their 
expansion and subsequent effect on interstate commerce—is 
instructive of how courts may apply the doctrine in the context of 
TNCs.37 As the majority of regulations promulgated by state and 
local governments concerning TNCs purport to address various 
road safety concerns,38 comparison to the Court’s treatment of 
similarly motivated laws in the context of the transportation 
cases may provide insight to the approach courts will take if 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges are raised. This Note 
maintains that courts will likely utilize the ad hoc balancing 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 397–98 
(1998) (implying that if a particular type of restriction is violative of the self-
executing dormancy principle, then sufficiently analogous regulations are 
similarly unconstitutional). So long as such invalidation was widely recognized 
and given credence, broader advances could be made by TNCs to penetrate 
domestic markets. See Lawler, supra note 21 (indicating that regulatory hurdles 
have stood in the way of more rapid expansion of the company’s services). 
Acknowledging the speed bumps of the unavoidably piecemeal approach to 
expansion taken by Uber thus far, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick intimated that 
“[e]very city we [Uber] go to, eventually the regulators will make something up 
to keep us from rolling out or continuing our business.” Id. 
 35. See Lawrence, supra note 34, at 403 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “erratic,” with “complex 
exceptions” and “dubious consistency”). 
 36. See infra Part V (providing a framework for how courts will likely 
analyze most TNC regulations enacted in pursuit of local health and safety 
interests). 
 37. See infra Part V (discussing the insight that examination of dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges in the transportation cases may offer for 
evaluating potential dormancy challenges in the TNC context).  
 38. See infra Part VI (discussing the various types of TNC regulations—
licensing, insurance, and otherwise—enacted in the name of protecting 
consumers and others on the road). 
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approach articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.39 to analyze 
the majority of TNC regulations and bans challenged on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds.40 However, if courts come to 
characterize certain types of TNC regulations and bans as 
discriminatory or impermissibly protectionist by virtue of their 
motivations or effects—finding that they unduly burden 
interstate commerce and a federal common market—they will be 
met with an almost certainly fatal form of strict scrutiny review 
that regards such discrimination as per se invalid.41 
This Note is structured as follows: Part II will consider the 
breadth of Congress’s commerce power and the extent to which 
states may regulate matters affecting interstate commerce. 
Explaining the dormant Commerce Clause and the limits it 
places on commerce-burdening regulations promulgated by 
states, Part III lays the foundation for contending that certain 
TNC regulations may run afoul of the dormancy principle. Part 
IV describes the framework that the Supreme Court has outlined 
for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges. This is 
included for two reasons. First, to understand the current 
approach for evaluating dormancy challenges, it is important to 
note the potholes the Court has encountered in arriving at its 
modern interests-balancing test. Second, Part IV further explains 
how potential challenges will be evaluated and the consequences 
stemming from characterizing a particular regulation as 
discriminatory or not. If certain regulations come to be 
characterized as discriminatory, impermissibly protectionist, or 
overly extraterritorial in reach, they will likely violate the 
dormancy doctrine. On the other hand, if certain regulations are 
found to be nondiscriminatory and enacted in furtherance of a 
legitimate state interest by appropriate means, they will probably 
be constitutionally sound. In addition to providing concrete 
examples of the Court’s application of the interests-balancing 
                                                                                                     
 39. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  
 40. See infra Part VI (arguing that most regulations will be subject to Pike 
balancing because their aim is to affect protections for consumer and roadway 
safety, unless they are characterized as impermissibly protectionist and thereby 
per se invalid).  
 41. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (outlining the dormancy 
doctrine’s application and explaining that state regulations that discriminate 
against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of invalidity). 
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approach to dormancy challenges, Part V examines the Court’s 
application of the doctrine in the context of transportation and 
roadway regulations. This section aims to give insight into the 
rubric by which roadway regulations of TNCs may be adjudged, 
particularly in light of the similar shake-up that TNCs are 
having on our transportation infrastructure—one akin to that 
caused by the rapid growth of the highway system and interstate 
trucking industry. Part VI reviews examples of existing and 
possibly forthcoming TNC regulations, arguing that while most 
are justified exercises of state’s police powers, others may 
potentially run afoul of the dormancy doctrine. Recognizing 
states’ interests in regulating TNCs, Part VI also proposes 
guidance for the formulation of viable regulations that maintain a 
predictable and fair marketplace for TNC platforms. Part VII will 
conclude. 
II. The Commerce Clause and State Power to Regulate Commerce 
Arguably the most far-reaching of the express domestic 
powers granted to Congress under Article I, § 8 of the 
Constitution is the power to regulate commerce.42 The Court gave 
the commerce power its initial interpretation in Gibbons v. 
Ogden,43 whereby it outlined the contours of the terms 
“commerce” and “among the several states.”44 An expansive vision 
of this grant of federal powers prevailed.45  
                                                                                                     
 42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3, at 247 (4th ed. 2011) 
(noting that an exceedingly expansive view of the commerce power has allowed 
Congress to enact legislation affecting all areas of life, even those that do not 
obviously appear to be economic or interstate in nature).  
 43. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  
 44. See id. at 221–22 (finding a New York licensing requirement for out-of-
state operators inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting 
trade). In Gibbons, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York 
state law giving individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters 
within state jurisdiction while requiring out-of-state boats to pay substantial 
fees for navigation privileges. Id. at 1–3. At issue was whether New York had 
exercised authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the 
regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 26–27. The Court resolved that the 
New York law was invalid on the ground that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution designated power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce and 
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Gibbons also gave the Court opportunity to examine whether 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce is exclusive or concurrent 
with that of the states.46 Although the case was resolved on 
Supremacy Clause47 grounds, Justice Marshall considered 
whether state inspection laws that had an effect on interstate 
commerce were constitutional.48 In delineating the nature of the 
commerce power, Justice Marshall resolved that such state 
regulation constituted an acceptable exercise of state police power 
as opposed to an impermissible exercise of the national power 
over interstate commerce.49 Although this distinction was useful 
for recognizing acceptable exercises of state police powers, it left 
unresolved the issue of how to know when a state law does not 
comport with the national commerce power and the effect 
therefrom.50  
                                                                                                     
that the broad definition of commerce included navigation and other forms of 
commercial intercourse that is “intermingled with” the states. Id. at 189–90.  
 45. See id. at 196–97 (“This power, like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no 
limitation, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.”).  
 46. See id. at 13–20 (examining whether the Constitution and its framers 
intended for “the States [to] have a concurrent power with Congress, of 
regulating commerce”). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution and federal 
laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding”); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210 (declaring that “the acts of 
New York must yield to the law of  
Congress . . . .”).  
 48. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 61–62 (examining whether such state laws, 
having a tangible effect on and amounting to a regulation of interstate 
commerce, can be executed in light of Congress’s absolute power to regulate 
commerce among the states). 
 49. See id. 
These restrictions imply, that the general power to regulate 
commerce, is concurrently in the States, and that it may be exercised 
by the States in all cases to which these prohibitions do not extend. 
But, the same implication is still stronger from the nature and terms 
of those prohibitory clauses. The State may lay duties on imports and 
exports, to execute its inspection laws. That class of laws are, or may 
be, essential regulations of commerce, and they derive their authority 
altogether from State power. The existence of a power to pass them, 
is, therefore, expressly recognised by the constitution. 
 50. See id. (supplying guidance for when regulations may be characterized 
as exercises of a state’s police powers).  
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Gibbons did not afford Justice Marshall a full opportunity to 
pass judgment on the existence of an implied negative aspect of 
the Commerce Clause, but Marshall did opine that there was 
“great force” in the argument for it.51 Marshall did not hesitate to 
note that a state law could be “repugnant to the power to regulate 
commerce in its dormant state.”52 In 1849, however, the Court 
held “a state’s action violative of the Commerce Clause” for the 
first time despite “the absence of a relevant federal statute.”53 
Cementing this view of the Commerce Clause’s breadth, the 
Court proclaimed that the grant of the commerce power in and of 
itself prohibited certain state legislation by rendering 
congressional power “exclusive” over “subjects . . . in their nature 
national.”54 
III. The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on State 
Regulation of Commerce 
The dormant Commerce Clause is the idea that courts may 
invalidate state laws for running afoul of the Commerce Clause 
or the limiting principles implied from it.55 As illustrated above, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the grant of power to 
Congress in Article I, § 8—to regulate commerce among the 
states—as implying a “dormant” or negative aspect, thereby 
limiting the ability of states to either “discriminate against”56 or 
impose an “undue burden”57 on interstate commerce.58 This legal 
                                                                                                     
 51. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause principle by maintaining that 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce “must be exclusive”). 
 52. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) 
(expounding on the contours of the of the commerce power after Gibbons). 
 53. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6–4, at 1047 n.6 
(3d ed. 2000) (discussing The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849), in which the 
Court struck down charges on ship masters arriving from out-of-state ports to 
defray potential costs associated with incoming passengers). 
 54. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851). 
 55. See DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209 
(2004) (articulating the dormant Commerce Clause in its most simple 
formulation). 
 56. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). 
 57. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951).  
 58. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852) (declaring that 
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doctrine serves as a self-executing limitation on state power to 
regulate interstate commerce and is held to apply even when 
Congress has not acted or no preemption is found.59 Although the 
dormant Commerce Clause has its opponents,60 it is a centuries-
old,61 deeply ingrained doctrine,62 showing no signs of fading from 
our constitutional tradition.63 Recognized as one of the most 
                                                                                                     
the grant of the commerce power to Congress in and of itself precluded certain 
types of state lawmaking, for congressional power was deemed “exclusive” as to 
“subjects . . . in their nature national”), overruled on other grounds, Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 59. See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.01 (1999) (maintaining that the Supreme Court “has 
fashioned a self-executing Commerce Clause, which, when applicable, prohibits 
state regulatory action even when Congress has not acted”); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 42, § 5.3, at 430 (noting that the restriction on state and local 
governments from passing unduly burdensome or protectionist laws applies 
even in the absence of a conflict between state and federal statutes); Hunt v. 
Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (maintaining that the 
Commerce Clause itself is “a limitation upon state power even without 
congressional implementation”). 
 60. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564, 611 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The negative Commerce Clause 
has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved 
virtually unworkable in application.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “the negative 
commerce clause’ . . . is ‘negative’ not only because it negates state regulation of 
commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution”); see also 
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 573 (1987) 
(contending that the dormant Commerce Clause “lacks any basis in 
constitutional democratic theory,” and that the task of regulating commerce and 
invalidating state laws should not be left to an unelected federal judiciary). 
 61. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199–200 (1824) (defining broadly the 
scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to include an 
independent limit on state power, even where Congress has not acted).  
 62. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1944)  
[It is] accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, 
without the aid of Congressional legislation . . . affords some 
protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, 
and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and 
not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final 
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests. 
 63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 435 (“The dormant commerce 
clause, of course, is firmly established and has been a part of constitutional law 
for almost two centuries.”). As space prohibits a thorough examination and 
defense of the doctrine’s foundations, this Note takes the dormant Commerce 
Clause as a given—“a doctrinal fact of life that the Court is unlikely to 
repudiate.” Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the 
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important implied limits on state power, the Court’s use of the 
doctrine has time and again put the brakes on the forces of 
localism that threaten the “retarding and Balkanizing [of] 
American commerce, trade, and industry.”64  
The doctrine has numerous justifications, but the central 
rationale is that “[t]he Constitution . . . was framed upon the 
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim 
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in 
union and not division.”65 Pointing out that impediments to 
interstate commerce are likely to harm the overall economy, 
Professor Donald Regan notes that “protectionism [by states] is 
inefficient because it diverts business away from presumptively 
low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of 
a benefit that deserves approval from the point of view of the 
nation as a whole.”66 Justice Kennedy reiterated the doctrine’s 
importance to our Constitutional forefather’s vision of 
government by repeating that “[t]he central rationale for the rule 
against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws 
whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would 
excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution 
was designed to prevent."67 Positing that states and their citizens 
should not be harmed by laws in other states where they lack 
political representation, the doctrine maintains that the national 
economy is better off if state and local laws impeding interstate 
                                                                                                     
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[Age], 29 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 7 n.3 (2003). 
 64. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see Redish & Nugent, supra note 60, at 574–75 (“[T]he Court, 
relying on the clause, has invalidated state licensing requirements, train length 
restrictions, mudguard requirements, truck length prohibitions, and various 
produce regulations.” (citations omitted)).  
 65. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
 66. Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1118 (1986); see 
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785,  
794–808 (2001) (arguing that primary purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause 
is to combat the trade protectionism that can result from decentralized 
regulation by individual states). 
 67. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143–45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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commerce are invalidated.68 All of these justifications serve to 
emphasize that states’ obstructions to interstate commerce and 
discrimination against those from other states frustrate the goal 
of maintaining a federal common market for goods and services.69 
IV. Setting a Standard of Review for Dormant Commerce Clause 
Challenges 
A. Initial Speed Bumps  
Notwithstanding the doctrine’s enshrinement in our 
constitutional jurisprudence, the Court has struggled to outline 
clearly the scope and application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine as well as how aggressively courts should 
scrutinize state and local laws.70 Consistency has never been the 
hallmark of adjudication in this area of the law, and “no 
conceptual approach identifies all of the factors that may bear on 
a particular case.”71 After giving life to the doctrine in Gibbons, 
and to provide predictability for lawmakers and regulators, the 
Court attempted to draw rigid categories of areas where federal 
law was exclusive and those where states could regulate.72 
                                                                                                     
 68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 432–33 (illuminating the 
economic and political justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 69. See id. at 433 (noting that the numerous justifications for the doctrine 
are not mutually exclusive and instead share a common thread).  
 70. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 283 (1849) (invalidating a 
New York law, by a Court split five to four, that required every incoming 
passenger to pay for the costs of health inspections and treatment, with every 
Justice writing a separate opinion); COENEN, supra note 55, at 209 (“Application 
. . . [of the doctrine] requires courts to make tough contextual judgments as they 
work their way through an endless stream of cases involving every imaginable 
form of state law.”).  
 71. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); see also 
COENEN, supra note 55, at 222 (“This introduction to the dormant Commerce 
Clause principle reveals . . . its doctrinal complexity. What’s more, this 
summary understates that complexity because the Court sometimes structures 
its analysis in ways that do not fit neatly within this framework.”).  
 72. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (distinguishing 
between state laws that directly interfered with interstate commerce, and thus 
were invalid, as opposed to those that only had an indirect effect and were 
permissible); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319–20 (1851) 
(distinguishing between subject matter that is national, in which event state 
laws are invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause, and subject matter 
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Having recognized the difficulties of a formalistic, categorical 
approach, the Court shifted gears in 1945, moving instead 
towards an interests-balancing approach for seemingly 
nondiscriminatory laws, while retaining a categorical approach 
for those held to be impermissibly protectionist and 
discriminatory.73 
B. Towards a Cohesive Analytic Framework: Incorporating an 
Interests-Balancing Approach 
The Court’s modern approach to dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges is no longer based on rigid categories—national versus 
local subject matter, and direct versus indirect interference—but 
rather on courts balancing the benefits of a law against the 
burdens that it imposes on interstate commerce.74 The Court 
emphasized that dormant Commerce Clause analysis must turn 
on “the relative weights of the state and national interests 
involved.”75 Recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of determining 
whether a statute has violated the dormancy doctrine, one apt 
commentator and advocate of the Court’s balancing approach 
pointed out that “[o]nly by an evaluation of all the facts and 
circumstances can such an issue be decided by the Court.”76 
                                                                                                     
that is local, in which event state laws are allowed); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199–
200 (1824) (drawing a distinction between a state’s exercise of its police power 
and a state exercising the federal power over commerce). 
 73. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945)  
Hence the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature 
and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate 
trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, 
and whether the relative weights of the state and national interests 
involved are such [as to make the law permissible]. 
 74. The origin of this modern approach is generally credited to the 
scholarship of Noel Dowling. See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and 
State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1940) (advocating for what has become the 
modern balancing approach).  
 75. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770.  
 76. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised 
Version, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 1938–1962, at 280, 290. 
Dowling illustrated: 
Discrimination is a delusively simple term. How overreaching must a 
state measure be to merit condemnation as discriminatory? It seems 
apparent that in answering this question the Court must make the 
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Although this balancing approach afforded courts great 
discretion in weighing a law’s burden on interstate commerce 
against its putative benefits to the state or local government, the 
Court has since delineated a predictable framework for ad hoc 
balancing77 that involves a two-tiered structure for analyzing 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.78  
First, the Court asks whether the law, either on its face or in 
purpose or effect, discriminates against interstate commerce or 
out-of-state commercial actors.79 Laws that do are subject to a per 
se presumption of invalidity80 and are sustained only upon a 
                                                                                                     
same sort of value judgment that it has been making in performing 
its broader protective function. Discrimination exists or not, 
depending upon whether there is an economic justification for the 
difference in treatment which the state accords interstate commerce.  
Id. at 290.  
 77. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 220 (“The Court’s many modern 
decisions set out an overarching structure . . . for evaluating dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.”). But see id. at 222 (pointing out that the Court, at times, 
combines Pike balancing and extra-territoriality analysis, reverts to Cooley’s 
local-versus-national rhetoric or combines terminology and tests from its older 
jurisprudence); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (maintaining that the 
way in which the Court balances is not the same in all dormant Commerce 
Clause cases). 
 78. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 441 (explaining the two-
tiered structure of analyzing dormant Commerce Clause challenges); Will Sears, 
Full-Impact Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 157, 162 (2014) (noting that courts employ this approach to 
distinguish between regulations that directly or purposefully discriminate 
against interstate commerce and facially neutral regulations that indirectly 
burden interstate commerce). There are, however, exceptions to the dormant 
commerce clause—situations where laws otherwise violative of the doctrine are 
permissible. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 431 (noting the 
Congressional approval exception and “the market participation exception”). 
Neither of these exceptions is relevant in this context because Congress has not 
approved any of these state or local actions, and state and local governments 
have not sought to favor their “own citizens in receiving benefits from state and 
local governments or in dealing with government-owned businesses.” Id. at 431–
32.  
 79. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 224 (“The core of the modern dormant 
Commerce Clause principle lies in its prohibition of state laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce.”); e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (analyzing whether the challenged statute 
had a discriminatory effect on interstate sales in order to approximate the 
appropriate legal standard).  
 80. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (“State laws that 
discriminate against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.”). 
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showing by the state that the law serves an important local 
purpose and less discriminatory alternatives do not exist.81 Laws 
aiming to regulate commerce extraterritorially are similarly 
suspect under this strict per se rule.82  
If, on the other hand, the law is deemed nondiscriminatory 
towards out-of-staters, then a simple balancing test is used.83 
This balancing approach weighs “the law’s burdens on interstate 
commerce against its benefits.”84 If the law’s burden is “clearly 
excessive” in relation to its “putative local benefits,” it will be 
found unconstitutional.85 In contrast to discriminatory laws, 
those deemed nondiscriminatory are presumptively valid and 
afforded deference.86 This category is typically comprised of laws 
enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers, aiming to safeguard 
local health and safety.87 The Court’s modern interests-balancing 
approach, outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,88 is ordinarily 
used to evaluate the constitutionality of such regulations.89  
                                                                                                     
 81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (“[T]he law . . . will be 
upheld only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 582 (1986) (“New York’s liquor affirmation statute . . . regulates out-of-state 
transactions in violation of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 83. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 448 (explaining that local 
laws treating all alike, regardless of residence, are subject to a balancing test).  
 84. Id. 
 85. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
 86. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (noting that if the law is 
nondiscriminatory, then the presumption is in favor of upholding the law). 
 87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 440 (explaining that laws 
enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers are typically afforded deference, 
especially if they don’t expressly aim to regulate commerce).  
 88. See 397 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1970) (concluding that the burden placed on 
interstate commerce by Arizona’s state-of-origin packaging law is 
unconstitutional because Arizona’s interest in identifying the origin of 
cantaloupes is outweighed by the heavy cost of building and operating a packing 
plant in Arizona). In Pike, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
provision of the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act which 
prohibited interstate shipment of cantaloupes not packed in regular compact 
arrangements in closed standard containers. Id. at 138. Pike, the Arizona 
official in charge of enforcing the law, issued an order prohibiting a cantaloupe 
farming company from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from their Arizona 
ranch to a California packing and processing plant. Id. The Court maintained 
that a neutral statute with a legitimate purpose will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce exceeds the putative local benefits. Id. at 
142. Applying this test to the Arizona statute, the Court found it 
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C. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: The Court’s Modern Balancing 
Approach 
Pike indicated that, “[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits.”90 As summarized by 
Russell Chapin, the Pike balancing test should work as follows:91 
“As a threshold matter there is an inquiry as to whether the state 
interest is ‘legitimate’ (that is, not protectionist), and whether the 
regulation’s effect on interstate commerce is ‘incidental’ (that is, 
regulation of interstate commerce is not the overriding state 
interest).”92 A prima facie case to overturn the regulation can be 
made by showing discriminatory intent; that the regulation 
substantially burdens interstate commerce; or that the regulation 
burdens out-of-state interests more than it benefits in-state 
interests.93 In response, the state must prove that “the regulation 
substantially serves legitimate local interests and that its burden 
on interstate commerce is justified by the claimed local benefit.”94 
The state must also show that the incidental burden that the 
regulation has on interstate commerce regulation “is the least 
burdensome alternative.”95 To date, however, no 
                                                                                                     
unconstitutional given that the State’s interest in promoting and preserving the 
reputation of Arizona growers was not important enough to justify the burden 
on interstate commerce prohibiting deceptive packaging imposed. Id. at 145. 
 89. See Russell f, Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Limitation on State Authority to Regulate, 23 URB. LAW. 163, 168 (1991) 
(outlining and summarizing the threshold questions and characterizations for 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis). 
 90. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 91. See Chapin, supra note 89, at 168 (detailing the analytical framework 
for dormant Commerce Clause analysis).  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. (explaining how challengers can make a prima facie case that 
the dormancy doctrine has been violated when the Pike balancing test is used).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 451 (noting that the 
Court “generally includes a ‘least restrictive alternative’ component”); 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S 456, 473 (1981) (finding a 
recycling law constitutional because less commerce-burdening activities were 
unavailing).  
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nondiscriminatory state law has been invalidated on the ground 
that its goal could be achieved by means less burdensome on 
interstate commerce.96  
As a consequence of the deference afforded to laws that 
appear tied to a state’s police power, health and safety laws are 
typically invalidated only upon showing that the law’s burdens on 
interstate commerce clearly outweigh its benefits.97 But notably, 
the deferential Pike balancing is not without teeth.98 
Notwithstanding the Court’s vacillations on the vigor with which 
it would invoke the doctrine, it has made it abundantly clear, 
particularly in the context of laws regulating key channels of 
interstate commerce, that “[the] Court, and not the state 
legislature, is . . . the final arbiter of the competing demands of 
state and national interest.”99  
1. A Difficult Threshold Question 
Given the consequences of characterizing a state’s purpose as 
either discriminatory or legitimate, addressing this threshold 
matter is critical in assessing the validity of a state regulation.100 
Unsurprisingly, difficulties arise in identifying whether the state 
law has a discriminatory purpose.101 Facially nondiscriminatory 
                                                                                                     
 96. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 451 (noting that laws found 
violative of the dormancy principle based on the existence of a less restrictive 
alternative all involved discrimination).  
 97. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one 
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will, of 
course, depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities. 
 98. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (recognizing that 
even statutes that regulate evenhandedly may fall victim to the dormancy 
doctrine).  
 99. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1944).  
 100. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (noting that 
discriminatory regulations receive a practically fatal variety of strict scrutiny 
whereas neutral regulations based on legitimate state interests receive 
deferential review). 
 101. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 240 (noting that three questions arise: 
“(1) What is a discriminatory purpose?; (2) How should courts go about the 
business of characterizing state purposes?; and (3) How does one prove that an 
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statutes preceded by preambles indicating a purpose to bolter a 
state’s economic advantages while neutralizing out-of-state 
competition are few and far between.102 The vast majority of cases 
are thornier, as not all regulations with an economic purpose are 
protectionist or discriminatory.103 Many state laws that “guard 
against road wear, unfair trade practices, monopolization, and 
even theft have economic purposes entirely proper for states to 
pursue.”104  
An analogous issue is that of “characteriz[ing] the purpose 
with which the legislature has acted.”105 Looking past the state’s 
purported safety justification, the Court in Buck v. Kuykendall106 
found that the “state’s refusal to license the operation of a 
Portland-to-Seattle ‘auto stage line’ on the ground that the route 
applied for was already adequately served was impermissible.”107 
The characterization of this regulation as discriminatory 
amounted to its violation of the dormancy principle. The primary 
purpose was not “regulation with a view to safety or to 
conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of 
competition.”108  
                                                                                                     
allegedly improper purpose was the actual purpose that drove the government’s 
decision?”).  
 102. See id. (noting that it is easy to detect discrimination in cases where 
there is a “smoking gun,” such as a near candid admission that the purpose of a 
law is to keep foreign goods out or to insulate local industry from competition); 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (insisting that the 
courts must look beyond “the rare instance where the state artlessly discloses an 
avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods”).  
 103. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 
187–88 (1950) (explaining that a state’s price-fixing of natural gas extracted in 
the state to curtail demand was not marked by a discriminatory purpose by 
reasoning that the law limited gas sales “whether destined for interstate or 
intrastate consumers” in a way reasonably tailored to conserving a scarce 
resource).  
 104. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242. But see H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 
336 U.S. 525, 526, 535 (1949) (endorsing broad state authority to protect the 
“health and safety” of residents but finding fault with license denial that would 
“protect and advance local economic interests”).  
 105. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242 
 106. 267 U.S. 307 (1925).  
 107. COENEN, supra note 55, at 242. 
 108. Buck, 267 U.S. at 315.  
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V. The Transportation Cases 
Although courts afford great deference to state regulations in 
the field of highway safety as challengers must overcome a 
“strong presumption of validity,”109 the Supreme Court has 
established that maintaining a cohesive and unburdened national 
highway network is a substantial countervailing interest.110 
Particularly in transportation cases, the Court has shown a 
greater inclination to do more under the dormant Commerce 
Clause than merely suppress state protectionism.111 Viewing an 
effective transportation network as essential to promoting a 
federal common market for goods and services, the Court often 
has not afforded ordinary Pike deference to challenged 
nondiscriminatory regulations.112 Taking the transportation cases 
as a whole, it appears that a “specialized version of the Pike 
balancing test [emerges] in highway safety (or perhaps all safety) 
cases.”113  
A. Interests-Balancing in Pre-Pike Transportation Cases 
Though the Court initially “sounded a theme of deference”114 
towards safety-oriented transportation regulations, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 109. Lisa J. Petricone, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Sensible Standard 
of Review, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 443, 448–49 (1987). 
 110. See Regan, supra note 66, at 1177 (noting that there is a national 
interest in the existence of an effective transportation network linking the 
states, which is as essential to genuine political union as the suppression of 
protectionism).  
 111. See id. at 1182 (insisting that the Court appears to go beyond merely 
suppressing protectionism in transportation cases more often than it does in 
movement-of-goods cases); infra Part V.B (noting that the Court has critically 
examined commerce-burdening legislation aimed at regulating critical channels 
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce). 
 112. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (noting that the doctrine has served to retard the Balkanization of 
“American commerce, trade, and industry”); Regan, supra note 66, at 1184 
(indicating reasons for the special importance of an effective transportation 
network).  
 113. See id. at 1177 (delineating the recognized strong interest in 
maintaining an unburdened national transportation infrastructure). 
 114. COENEN, supra note 55, at 256; see South Carolina State Highway Dep’t 
v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 192 (1938) (upholding a vehicle weight and 
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soon shifted gears in the seminal pre-Pike case of Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona.115 “Using a balancing methodology to 
invalidate a facially neutral Arizona train-length law,”116 the 
Court laid the foundation for ad hoc balancing in the 
transportation context.117 Unlike in past examinations of 
transportation regulations enacted in the name of public 
safety,118 the Court closely scrutinized all of the pertinent 
consequences of the state regulation alongside its intersection 
with the regulations of neighboring states.119 
The Court began its examination of the challenged regulation 
by proceeding to outline the countervailing state and federal 
interests.120 First analyzing the federal-interest side of the 
balance, the Court maintained that there was “no doubt that the 
Arizona Train Limit Law impose[d] a serious burden . . . on 
interstate commerce.”121 Acknowledging that Arizona was one of 
only two states limiting freight trains to seventy cars and stood 
                                                                                                     
width limit upon finding a “rational basis” for the state’s judgment that its 
regulations reduced highway accidents).  
 115. 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text 
(noting the Supreme Court’s shift towards an interests-balancing approach in 
the context of safety-oriented regulations).  
 116. COENEN, supra note 55, at 257. “Train length” refers to the number of 
cars in length that a train is permitted to be. See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 771–72 
(defining “train length”).  
 117. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona signaled a shift towards an interests-balancing approach 
for dormant Commerce Clause challenges); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight 
Lines, Inc., 358 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (concluding that an Illinois statute 
requiring use of contour rear fender mudguards on trucks and trailers operated 
on state highways, rather than customary straight mudguards, though a 
nondiscriminatory local safety measure, placed an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce). 
 118. See Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. at 192 (affording deference to South 
Carolina’s motor vehicle width and weight limits upon deeming it sufficient that 
there was a “rational basis” for the state’s judgment that its regulations 
improved highway safety); Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92, 94–98 
(1933) (acceding to Ohio’s refusal to authorize a new motorized common-carrier 
service between Cleveland and western Michigan by proceeding with a cautious 
balancing analysis).  
 119. See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 773–79 (examining closely the practical 
effects that the regulation would have on interstate commerce). 
 120. See id. at 773 (evaluating the competing interests in regulating train 
length in this context).  
 121. Id. 
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alone in limiting passenger trains to fourteen cars, the Court 
intimated that Arizona’s law was significantly out of step with 
other states’ regulations.122 An inevitable consequence of the law 
would be significant cost increases for carriers, requiring either 
the breaking up of long trains upon entrance into Arizona or 
rerouting them altogether to avoid entry into the state.123 In 
evaluating the resulting burden on interstate, the Court noted 
that the regulation cost the Southern Pacific company alone 
about one million dollars per year; that 95% percent of Arizona’s 
rail traffic was interstate in nature; that the law effectively 
controlled “train operations beyond the boundaries of the state” 
by requiring train reconfiguration as far away as Los Angeles, 
California and El Paso, Texas; and that the cross-border 
deliveries would almost certainly face delays.124 
On the state-interest side of the balance, the Court took note 
of the trial court’s findings “that the Arizona law had no 
reasonable relation to safety” and in fact “made train operation 
more dangerous.”125 Although the Arizona Supreme Court had 
not accepted these factual determinations, the U.S. Supreme 
Court was persuaded that any safety advantage gained by 
shortening trains was effectively “offset by the increase in the 
number of accidents resulting from the larger number of trains 
when train lengths are reduced.”126 The Court deemed it 
significant that the primary safety problems associated with long 
trains—so-called slack-action accidents—were “relatively the 
same” in Arizona as in Nevada, which handled “substantially the 
same amount of traffic” without regulating train lengths at all.127 
The Court distinguished earlier cases upholding state laws 
that required locomotive headlights and full train crews both 
because those laws genuinely “removed or reduced safety 
hazards” and because they created no substantial interference 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. (noting that Arizona’s regulation was inconsistent with the 
approach that the vast majority of states had taken). 
 123. See id. (accounting for the economic consequences that such a 
regulation would have on carriers). 
 124. See id. at 775 (noting the commerce-burdening practical realities 
resulting from the regulation). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 778.  
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with the interstate movement of trains.128 In a similar vein, the 
Court distinguished Barnwell not only because it involved 
government-maintained highways but also because its stringent 
width and weight rules fell on intrastate and interstate truckers 
alike.129 In contrast, as Chief Justice Stone explained in Southern 
Pacific, “the burden of [Arizona’s train-length] regulation falls on 
interests outside the state” so that it was “unlikely to be 
alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally 
exerted when interests within the state are affected.”130 
The Court in Southern Pacific emphasized that a state could 
not avoid the restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause by 
“simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police 
power.”131 Rather, “the decisive question is whether in the 
circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in 
reducing accidents and casualties is so slight and problematical 
as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate 
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it.”132 
The Arizona train law flunked this test because it generated “at 
most a slight and dubious” safety advantage while “preventing 
the free flow of commerce by delaying it and by substantially 
increasing its cost and impairing its efficiency.”133  
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,134 the court utilized the 
same balancing approach to strike down an Illinois law requiring 
all commercial trucks operating in the state to be equipped with a 
certain type of mudguard.135 Just as in Southern Pacific, there 
was no federal regulation on this point, but “straight” mudguards 
were the industry standard and “legal in at least 45 States.”136 
Illinois maintained that curved mudguards were more effective in 
                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 779. 
 129. See id. at 765 n.2 (explaining that the burden of Arizona’s regulation 
fell almost entirely on interests outside the state).  
 130. Id. at 765 n.2.  
 131. Id. at 780. 
 132. Id. at 775–76. 
 133. Id. at 779.  
 134. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).  
 135. See id. at 529 (invalidating an Illinois law requiring trucks to use 
“contour” mudguards whilst almost all states authorized—and in some 
instances mandated—the use of “straight” mudguards).  
 136. Id. at 523.  
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preventing stones and debris from being kicked up from the back 
of trucks, thereby having greater potential to reduce accidents 
resulting therefrom.137 For trucking companies moving goods 
through Illinois the practical effect would be to require drivers to 
use one type of mudguards when traveling through Illinois, and 
another while in other states—or switch to curved mudguards 
altogether.138 Unlike in Southern Pacific, the Court was 
unanimous in finding the statute unconstitutional.139 
While acknowledging that state “safety measures carry a 
strong presumption of validity,”140 the Court found the alleged 
benefits in increased safety were outweighed by the heavy burden 
on interstate commerce resulting from out-of-state truck drivers 
having to stop at the Illinois border to change mudguards.141 
Courts typically refused to pass judgment on the best way to 
achieve safety objectives, as policy decisions in this field are “for 
the state legislature, absent federal entry . . . .”142 But, if the 
“total effect of a law as a safety measure in reducing accidents 
and casualties” does not outweigh the “national interest in 
keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which 
seriously impede it,” the law may run afoul of the dormancy 
doctrine.143  
Southern Pacific and Bibb laid the groundwork for the 
Court’s subsequent application of the Pike balancing test in the 
transportation context, formalizing the analytic framework for 
evaluating nondiscriminatory regulations enacted in furtherance 
of local health and safety.   
                                                                                                     
 137. See id. at 525 (“Illinois introduced evidence seeking to establish that 
contour mudguards had a decided safety factor in that they prevented the 
throwing of debris into the faces of drivers of passing cars and into the 
windshields of a following vehicle.”). 
 138. See id. at 524 (noting the substantial burden and potential 
extraterritorial effect that this regulation would have on interstate commerce). 
 139. See id. at 520 (establishing that all the Justices agreed with Justice 
Douglas’s reasoning and the Court’s result).  
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 530 (“[T]he heavy burden which the Illinois mudguard law 
places on the interstate movement of trucks and trailers seems to us to pass the 
permissible limits even for safety regulations.”). 
 142. Id. at 524.  
 143. Id. 
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B. Pike Interests-Balancing in the Trucking Cases 
Despite originally stating a reluctance to use the Commerce 
Clause to invalidate state regulations in the field of safety,144 the 
Court struck down two nondiscriminatory statutes enacted in the 
name of regulating highway safety shortly after announcing the 
Pike balancing test.145 Because the existence of a legitimate state 
interest in regulating transportation on municipal roads and 
interstate highways in furtherance of public safety is rarely in 
dispute, the Court has instead focused its attention on 
scrutinizing the rational relationship between the state objective 
and the regulation.146 This approach to balancing in the 
transportation safety context was evident in Raymond Motor 
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice147—the first case in which a 
nondiscriminatory motor-vehicle law was invalidated using the 
Pike test.148  
At issue in Raymond was whether Wisconsin regulations 
“governing the length and configuration of trucks that may be 
operated within the State” violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.149 Of particular relevance was a Wisconsin statute setting 
a limit of fifty-five-feet “on the overall length of a vehicle pulling 
one trailer” and prohibiting double-trailer trucks.150 The Court 
ultimately ruled that the regulation violated the dormancy 
doctrine because its contribution to highway safety was no more 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 190–91 (affording deference to a 
regulation enacted pursuant to a state’s police powers). 
 145. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) 
(finding an Iowa statute prohibiting the use of sixty-five-foot double trailer 
trucks within its borders unconstitutional); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. 
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (finding a Wisconsin regulation barring trucks 
longer than 55 feet from traveling on state highways without a permit to be 
unconstitutional). 
 146. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 680–81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not 
the function of the court to decide whether in fact the regulation promotes its 
intended purpose, so long as an examination of the evidence before or available 
to the lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of 
its purposes.”). 
 147. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). 
 148. See id. at 447 (finding a Wisconsin statute limiting truck lengths to 
fifty-five feet violative of the dormancy doctrine).  
 149. Id. at 430.  
 150. Id. at 432. 
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than “speculative,” while the burden it placed on interstate 
commerce was substantial.151 Raymond was of limited 
precedential value,152 however, because Wisconsin offered 
practically no evidence indicating that the longer trucks were less 
safe.153 Additionally, the state offered no response to the 
challengers’ contention that exclusion of sixty-five-foot “doubles” 
would significantly burden interstate commerce.154 Less than 
three years later, the Court took notice of a nearly identical 
statute, but this time it was supported with substantial 
legislative findings on its local safety benefits.155 
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,156 the Court 
again considered whether a truck-length limitation was an 
unreasonable safety measure in contravention of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.157 Iowa, unlike all its neighboring states, 
prohibited sixty-five-foot “double” trucks within its borders, 
maintaining that this was a purely local regulation concerning 
roadway safety.158 Although Iowa did offer some evidence of a 
safety justification,159 the Court was unwilling to defer to Iowa’s 
legislature that the statute furthered roadway safety—instead 
maintaining that the “illusory” safety justification unduly 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. at 447 (indicating that the balance tipped significantly in favor 
of invalidating the regulations).  
 152. See id. at 447 (“Our holding is a narrow one, for we do not decide 
whether laws of other States restricting the operation of trucks over 55 feet . . . 
would be upheld if the evidence . . . were not so overwhelmingly one-sided as in 
this case.”) 
 153. See id. at 448 (“Wisconsin has failed to make even a colorable showing 
that its regulations contribute to highway safety.”). 
 154. See id. at 445 (noting that the regulations were shown, “without 
contradiction,” to “impose a substantial burden on the interstate movement of 
goods”).  
 155. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671–72 (1981) 
(“Iowa [has] made a more serious effort to support the safety rationale of its law 
than did Wisconsin in Raymond, but its efforts was no more persuasive.”). 
 156. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 157. See id. at 664 (analyzing whether Iowa’s prohibition of certain large 
trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce). 
 158. See id. at 665 (noting that all other Western and Midwestern States 
authorized the sixty-five-foot doubles that Iowa sought to exclude). 
 159. See id. at 672 (noting that Iowa pointed to three ways in which the 
fifty-five-foot singles were “arguably superior: singles take less time to be passed 
and to clear intersections; they may back up for longer distances; and they are 
somewhat less likely to jackknife”). 
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burdened interstate commerce.160 Revealing an intention to apply 
a more rigorous version of rational basis review, the Court 
maintained that Iowa failed to produce any persuasive evidence 
that sixty-five-foot trucks are less safe than fifty-five-foot 
trucks.161 The Court made clear that “[r]egulations designed for 
that salutary purpose [(safety)] nevertheless may further the 
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so 
substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.”162   
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Kassel, weighing the 
asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with 
interstate commerce, has come to be “considered the standard of 
review for highway safety regulations challenged under the 
Commerce Clause.”163 Willing to second-guess legislative 
judgments in the field of safety, Powell’s approach has informed 
the Court’s subsequent treatment of municipal and state highway 
safety regulations.164 Safety benefits deemed “demonstrably 
trivial,”165 “illusory, insubstantial, or nonexistent,”166 would be 
jettisoned, although it was unclear how closely the Court 
intended to scrutinize numerical cutoffs that necessarily arise in 
lawmaking.167 Kassel’s modified Pike approach to roadway 
regulations will likely be used by courts to evaluate 
nondiscriminatory TNC regulations enacted in furtherance of 
public health and safety.168 
                                                                                                     
 160. See id. at 671–75 (reasoning that the law could actually increase costs 
and accidents as shippers would travel additional miles to circumvent Iowa or 
be compelled to use more trucks to transport goods through the state).  
 161. See id. at 671 (finding support in the record that the sixty-five-foot 
doubles were just as safe as the fifty-five-foot singles and sixty-foot doubles that 
Iowa law permitted.) 
 162. Id. at 670; see id. at 671 (concluding that an Iowa statute limiting 
truck-length violated the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 163. Petricone, supra note 109, at 449. 
 164. See COENEN, supra note 56, at 265 (noting that all of the Justices in 
Kassel agreed that “claimed safety justifications will not always support 
validation of commerce-burdening legislation”).  
 165. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 697 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 166. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 167. See id. at 697 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that numerical 
cutoffs generally incorporate a degree of arbitrariness and that “[l]ines drawn 
for safety purposes will rarely pass muster if the question is whether a slight 
increment can be permitted without sacrificing safety”).  
 168. See Petricone, supra note 109, at 448 (stating that Kassel is “generally 
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Although the “4-2-3” decision in Kassel did reveal differences 
of opinion among the Justices, they all agreed that “claimed 
safety justifications will not always support validation of 
commerce-burdening legislation.”169 Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment that the Iowa law 
offended the dormancy doctrine.170 In Justice Brennan’s view, 
however, judicial second-guessing of legislative judgments “in the 
field of safety” is unwarranted and was unnecessary in the 
instant case.171 Finding sufficient evidence that the law amounted 
to thinly veiled protectionism, Justice Brennan reasoned that the 
problem with the law lay in its impermissibly discriminatory 
purpose.172 This difference in approach stemmed from the 
Justices’ differing characterizations of the statute’s purpose; 
namely, whether it was patently protectionist or aimed towards 
promoting local health and safety.173 Occasionally, both 
motivations can be gleaned from a particular regulation.174 But 
where an impermissibly discriminatory purpose cannot be 
unequivocally established, courts may nevertheless succumb to 
suspicions that a state’s true purpose is self-serving, as seemed to 
be the case in Kassel.175 Such considerations may color courts’ 
                                                                                                     
considered the standard of review for highway safety regulations challenged 
under the commerce clause”). 
 169. COENEN, supra note 55, at 264.  
 170. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 679, 686 (Brennan, J., concurring) (viewing the 
same considerations that dictated the holding in Raymond as requiring 
invalidation of Iowa’s regulation prohibiting sixty-five-foot doubles). 
 171. Id. at 680–81 n.1. 
 172. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring) (deeming the 
dormancy doctrine to proscribe protectionism by way of imposing undue 
financial and safety costs of road use on other states). 
 173. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the consequences of characterizing a 
regulation as either discriminatory and thereby presumptively invalid, or 
nondiscriminatory, subject instead to a Pike balancing test).  
 174. Compare Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670 (viewing Iowa’s highway safety 
regulations as an effort to govern a matter of local concern), with Kassel, 450 
U.S. at 681–85 (Brennan, J. concurring) (noting that by seeking to “discourage 
interstate traffic” on its highways, Iowa’s regulation had “nothing to do with 
these purported [safety] differences” and were instead “protectionist in nature”).  
 175. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that while 
the majority opinion recognized “that the State's actual purpose in maintaining 
the truck-length regulation was ‘to limit the use of its highways by deflecting 
some through traffic,’” it failed “to recognize that this purpose, being 
protectionist in nature, is impermissible under the Commerce Clause”).  
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application of the Pike balancing test, compelling judges to 
characterize stated safety interests as “illusory” if “a heavy 
burden on commerce hangs in the balance.”176  
Most significantly, Kassel revealed that the dormant 
Commerce Clause is “alive and well in the road regulation 
context.”177 Taken together with Raymond and its pre-Pike 
predecessors, the Court demonstrated readiness to invalidate 
nondiscriminatory commerce-burdening regulations of 
transportation178 during an era of rapid growth of the interstate 
highway system and trucking industry.179 It is possible that lower 
courts may undertake a similar posture when faced with 
evaluating states’ responses to the present, albeit unique, shake-
up of our transportation infrastructure.180  
VI. Dormant Commerce Clause Limits to TNC Regulations 
A. TNC Regulations Fall Within the Purview of the Commerce 
Clause 
State regulations of TNCs falls under the purview of the 
commerce clause because they regulate the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as actions that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.181 By regulating 
                                                                                                     
 176. See COENEN, supra note 55, at 265 (noting that these factors may lead 
judges to forego the strong rule of deference in the context of local health and 
safety regulations). 
 177. See id. at 266. 
 178. See supra Part V (discussing safety-oriented nondiscriminatory 
transportation regulations found to violate the dormancy doctrine). 
 179. See WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, AMERICAN HIGHWAY USERS ALLIANCE, 
40 YEARS OF THE US INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS 4 (1996) (noting 
that following its authorization in 1956, the Interstate Highway System grew 
rapidly, both in terms of absolute length and in terms of traffic volume—
carrying approximately 23% of the market share of all transportation systems). 
 180. See Regan, supra note 66, at 1182 (insisting that laws affecting the 
federal common market by regulating transportation have been subject to 
greater scrutiny by the Supreme Court than other nondiscriminatory commerce-
burdening regulations). 
 181. See Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 357 (1964) 
(“[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free 
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer 
open to question.” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 
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highways, airports, and other conduits through which interstate 
commerce moves—as well as people traveling from one state to 
another using TNC services—such regulations indisputably 
impinge on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.182 
But as Gibbons instructed, it is within the powers reserved to the 
states to regulate within their territory to improve the safety, 
health, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants.183 The 
critical inquiry is thus whether certain TNC regulations run afoul 
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s restriction prohibiting a state 
from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates 
against interstate commerce.184 Given that courts have conferred 
on individuals injured by state action that violates an aspect of 
the Commerce Clause the right to sue and obtain injunctive and 
declaratory relief, it is foreseeable that either TNCs or their users 
may challenge TNC regulations on dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds.185 
B. Challenged TNC Regulations Will Likely be Evaluated Using 
the Pike Balancing Test as Modified by Kassel 
The safety of passengers and others on the road are the most 
frequently cited concerns prompting the regulation of TNCs.186 
                                                                                                     
(1917))); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (“Congress' 
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.” (citation omitted)). 
 182. See supra Part I (discussing the various state and local laws 
promulgated to regulate TNC operations).  
 183. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (declaring that states’ 
police power “embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or 
the general prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to 
promote the public safety or the public health”). 
 184. See supra Part IV (discussing the modern framework for analyzing 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (establishing the modern interests-balancing approach). 
 185. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443–45 (1991) (granting 
individuals the right to sue for state violations of the Commerce Clause under 
28 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 186. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11 (noting that driver use of their phones 
by way of these app-based softwares in the course of providing ride-for-hire 
services is not only a violation of the California vehicle code laws, but also poses 
great and sometimes deadly risk to those on the road); Lien & Mitchell, supra 
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Although certain types of TNC regulations are seemingly 
violative of the anti-discrimination principle, and thereby 
presumptively invalid187—particularly those emblematic of 
Washington, D.C.’s original “five times the taxi rate ” 
proposal188—the majority of TNC regulations, like most 
regulations of ride-for-hire services, may be characterized as 
legitimate exercises of states’ police powers.189 Being enacted in 
the interest of public health and safety—even if influenced by 
industry competitors and advocacy groups seeking to veil 
protectionist motivations190—these regulations will likely be 
evaluated under the Pike balancing test as modified by Kassel 
and afforded significant deference as a result.191 Taken together, 
                                                                                                     
note 11 (citing the consumer protection lawsuit filed against Uber alleging that 
this TNC has mislead consumers about the safety of its services and the fairness 
of its rates).  
 187. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) 
(invalidating a seemingly neutral law declared to be operating like a protective 
tariff by depriving out-of-state competitors of the opportunity to undersell in-
state sellers). Though veiled discrimination may be difficult to prove, the Court 
has struck down subtle protectionist measures through the use of “analogistic 
reasoning,” declaring that “some laws . . . so closely parallel statutes that 
concededly violate the Constitution that those laws are likewise subject to 
judicial invalidation.” COENEN, supra note 55, at 232; see Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 
527 (reasoning that because the state had “set up what is equivalent to a 
rampart of customs duties,” the seemingly neutral law was deemed 
impermissibly discriminatory and thus unconstitutional). 
 188. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reporting on a proposed 
Washington, D.C. TNC regulation that would have required Uber sedans to 
charge a minimum of five times the “drop rate” for taxis in exchange for 
approval to operate in the District). 
 189. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 442 (1978) 
(noting that it is rarely disputed that states have a legitimate interest in 
regulating motor vehicles using its roads in order to promote highway safety); 
supra Part IV.C (discussing further the regulations promulgated to promote 
public safety and their potential treatment under the Pike balancing test).   
 190. See Ammori supra note 5 (mentioning a FTC report finding that many 
local taxi commissions colluded with and deliberately insulated taxi companies 
from competition by restricting the number of available license).  
 191. See Chapin, supra note 89 and accompanying text (regulations enacted 
pursuant to a legitimate exercise of state police powers will typically be 
evaluated under the Pike balancing test); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970) (stating that only regulations clearly excessive in relation to 
their putative local benefits will be held unconstitutional if they regulate even-
handedly in pursuit of a legitimate local interest). But see supra note 187 and 
accompanying text (noting that seemingly neutral laws may be found to operate 
analogously to impermissibly discriminatory and unduly commerce-burdening 
KEEP ON TRUCKIN’, UBER 173 
Pike, Raymond, and Kassel indicate that the Court will evaluate 
state laws regulating TNCs in the transportation context on a 
case-by-case basis, “considering the specific evidence as to the 
safety benefits of the laws compared to their burden on interstate 
commerce.”192  
C. Evaluations of Existing and Potentially Forthcoming TNC 
Regulations 
What follows below is an examination of archetypical TNC 
regulations, analyzing both how they might be scrutinized and 
their potential validity. Although TNCs were originally viewed 
across the board by states as illegal taxicab operations, or in the 
case of Uber “Black” as illegitimate charter party carriers, the 
presently prevailing view is to characterize TNCs as “pre-
arranged” transportation providers that require their own 
classification.193 The consequences of this characterization are 
that a state or local government’s regulation of TNCs should 
naturally be viewed in comparison to their regulations of other 
pre-arranged ride-for-hire providers.194  
1. Licensing Fees; Vehicle Inspection and Background Check 
Requirements; and Insurance Policy Requirements; Fare 
Algorithm Standardization 
                                                                                                     
regulations). 
 192. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, § 5.3, at 453; see supra Part V (discussing 
the approach that the Court used to evaluate safety-oriented regulations in the 
transportation context). 
 193. See Geron, supra note 3 (“The CPUC had previously issued cease and 
desist rulings against Lyft, SideCar, and Uber, arguing that these companies 
needed to be licensed, but then reached interim agreements with them to 
operate.”). Ridesharing apps are increasingly coming to be viewed as “pre-
arranged” transportation providers and therefore are not considered the same 
as taxis. Id. Had ridesharing companies not come to be considered as pre-
arranged transportation providers, they could be considered in the same 
category as taxis and thus banned outright without dormant Commerce Clause 
implications on the grounds that they were not complying with established taxi 
regulations. Id. 
 194. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (requiring 
even-handedness in the pursuit of legitimate local interests that incidentally 
burden interstate commerce).  
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State licensing and inspection requirements for businesses 
are typically routine, innocuous, and presumptively permissible 
exercises of state authority to regulate matters affecting 
commerce.195 In Gibbons, the Court noted that states’ concurrent 
power to enact laws that incidentally affect commerce included 
the authority to promulgate “inspection laws” and others of this 
sort.196 Alongside such indisputably permissible regulations are 
requirements for pre-arranged ride-for-hire services to acquire 
certain liability insurance policies as well as to have their 
vehicles subject to inspection and their drivers subject to 
background checks.197 Such consumer-protection and safety-
oriented regulations have consistently evaded dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny because they are paradigmatic of 
legitimate state interests in protecting the health and safety of 
residents.198 The standardization of measurements for fare 
calculation has also become accepted practice for protecting 
consumers from shoddy business practices, particularly in the 
context of taxi services.199 Absent showings that TNCs are being 
discriminated against vis-à-vis other pre-arranged ride-for-hire 
services—possible examples being arbitrary denials of licensure 
applications or vastly disproportionate fees for license or 
insurance requirements—such TNC regulations will easily 
survive Pike balancing.200  
                                                                                                     
 195. See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1824) (describing different, 
and presumptively authorized types of commerce-burdening state regulations, 
that states may enact).  
 196. Id. (“The State may lay duties on imports and exports, to execute its 
inspection laws.”).  
 197. See Geron, supra note 3 (implying that TNCs’ praise for the landmark 
operating agreement with the CPUC that imposed such conditions on providing 
service are accepted as a legitimate and desirable legal norm).  
 198. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 
434 (2005) (finding that Michigan's imposition of flat one hundred dollar annual 
fee on trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling was a valid exercise of 
the state’s police power, and did not violate dormant Commerce Clause). 
 199. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) 
(noting that states have broad powers to protect inhabitants against perils to 
health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of 
measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce). 
 200. See Am. Trucking Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 434 (concluding that an annual flat 
licensing fee was a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not violate 
dormant Commerce Clause). 
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2. Mandatory Pricing Schedules and Airport Service Bans 
Requirements for mandatory pricing schedules and steep 
minimum charges for TNC services seem to be examples of 
quintessentially discriminatory or unjustified regulation.201 
Hailing from places like Miami and Washington, D.C., these 
minimum fare requirements have the practical effect of making 
TNC services cost-prohibitive for users. Although it is possible to 
argue that this amounts to discrimination against out-of-state 
TNCs—and thereby lend to the presumptive invalidity of such 
regulations—state and local governments may be able to 
demonstrate that these regulations are “even-handed” and apply 
to in-state and out-of state actors alike.202 Given that these 
regulations will likely not facially discriminate against TNCs in 
particular and may be supported by various sorts of safety 
justifications, they will likely be evaluated under the Pike—
Kassel interests-balancing test.203 Courts may come to scrutinize 
such restrictions on service, particularly if the stated interests of 
state regulators are to make TNC services more costly with no 
reference to safety, as seemed to be the case in the Washington, 
D.C. proposal.204 An examination of the reasons for a particular 
numerical determination may also follow, investigating for 
example, why regulators chose to set the minimum rate at five-
times that of a taxi.205 This type of regulation seems to be 
precisely the kind that would be subject to a rigorous and fact-
intensive application of the Pike—Kassel test.206 If no strong 
                                                                                                     
 201. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994) (finding that Oregon’s $2.25 per ton surcharge on disposal of out-of-state 
waste is discriminatory on its face and violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
in view of the $0.85 per ton charge imposed on solid in-state waste).  
 202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 203. See id. (noting that nondiscriminatory safety-oriented regulations 
treated under a deferential interests-balancing approach).   
 204. See Fallows, supra note 15 (reporting on a Washington, D.C., proposal 
that would have allowed Uber to operate in the District in exchange for 
implementing a mandatory surcharge of five-times the taxi base charge).   
 205. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) 
(scrutinizing numerical cut-offs in a truck-length limitation in finding it 
violative of the dormancy principle).   
 206. See id. (evaluating a statute’s numerical limitation to determine 
whether it was justified in light of the evidence, or lack thereof, of increased 
safety).  
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safety justifications exist to support high base charges for TNC 
services and effectively regulate them out of existence in certain 
jurisdictions, then courts may find such regulations excessively 
burdensome on interstate commerce in relation to their “putative 
local benefit.”207  
Similarly, blanket airport bans restricting TNCs from 
transporting interstate travelers may be constitutionally suspect 
for lacking even-handedness.208 Given that other pre-arranged 
ride-for-hire services are universally permitted to operate within 
the jurisdiction of quasi-public airport authorities if they comport 
with licensing and fee requirements, prohibiting outright the 
possibility for TNCs to arrange service agreements akin to those 
of other pre-arranged car-for-hire services, seems to amount to 
impermissible protectionism and discrimination.209 Well-reasoned 
safety justifications for such blanket bans likely exist, and may 
lead courts to evaluate such bans under the modern interests-
balancing approach. Justifications for the bans may point to 
rationales premised on limiting unsustainable levels of traffic at 
airports or to cost-prohibitive logistical difficulties in ascertaining 
when a driver has actually entered the airport’s jurisdiction and 
how and whom to charge in such situations. Courts may look to 
see if there are less burdensome alternatives to such commerce-
burdening blanket bans, searching to find if the allegedly 
nondiscriminatory aims of these bans could not be achieved by 
more carefully-tailored means.210 If the safety benefits of such 
bans are “illusory” or solely that of marginally limiting airport 
traffic by forcing people to avoid driving or flying in to or out of a 
certain airport, then such bans may be held violative of the 
dormancy principle under the Pike balancing approach.211  
                                                                                                     
 207. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 208. See id. at 142 (noting that such commerce-burdening regulation must 
be even-handed and an appropriate measure in light of the nature of the harm 
to be controlled for).  
 209. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing examples of analogous situations in 
which a purportedly nondiscriminatory regulation could still be found to 
discriminate). 
 210. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and 
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.”). 
 211. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981). 
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3. Driver Uniform and Car Insignia Requirements 
Such regulations, long used in the taxi context, will feasibly 
be introduced in the context of TNC regulation.212 It is not hard to 
imagine the safety justifications for promulgating such 
regulations for car-for-hire services, given that they quite 
palpably serve to guard against consumer fraud while promoting 
consumer safety.213 Challenges to such requirements will likely 
be met with evaluation under the Pike—Kassel test.214 Though 
typically afforded deference, it is conceivable that such safety-
oriented regulations can result in overly burdensome demands on 
TNCs and their drivers.215 An illustrative example would be a 
requirement that drivers or cars in Virginia bear very 
particularized insignia or logos on their person or vehicle to 
identify themselves as TNC service providers.216 To further 
promote consumer safety, a requirement that taxi-like plexi-glass 
screens be installed in cars providing TNC services, despite 
evidence showing that the safety gains are only marginal. It may 
be the case, however, that the vast majority of surrounding 
jurisdictions—such as Washington, D.C., West Virginia, and 
North Carolina—require a completely different insignia and have 
no requirement for a safety divider in the car. Such regulations, 
though ostensibly promoting consumer safety despite, may be 
found unduly burdensome on interstate commerce because their 
practical effect would be to force drivers to either avoid entering 
the state of Virginia while in the course of performing TNC 
services or to buy all of the extra equipment to simply comply 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Geron, supra note 3 (indicating that the CPUC is mirroring TNC 
regulations on existing regulatory frameworks, particularly those developed in 
the taxi context).  
 213. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915) (noting that states’ police 
powers are “designed to promote public convenience or the general prosperity or 
welfare, as well  
as . . . the public safety or the public health”). 
 214. See supra Part V (indicating that regulations aimed at consumer 
protection and safety will be met with the modern interests-balancing test if 
challenged).  
 215. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671 (finding that the practical effects of this 
regulation would be significantly burdensome for the trucking industry as a 
whole).  
 216. See id. at 678 (drawing an exaggerated analogy to the challenged 
regulations in Kassel).   
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with the more restrictive law that would effectively change the 
industry standard.217  
VII. Conclusion 
Acutely aware of the challenges to national economic unity 
posed by various state highway regulations in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was steadfast in 
protecting the integrity of an unimpeded and cohesive interstate 
highway system.218 Driven by similar concerns, courts today may 
lend traction to dormant Commerce Clause challenges to TNC 
regulations enacted in furtherance of public safety, particularly if 
they are premised on illusory rationales or are poorly tailored to 
this end.219 
The viability of such challenges will depend on the 
disposition of judges with respect to their views on the proper role 
of the judiciary.220 Courts may be hesitant to overturn state and 
local regulations of TNCs because of concerns about undermining 
the Constitution’s carefully established structure for allocating 
power between federal and state governments.221  
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. at 671 (indicating that regulations with extensive 
extraterritorial and economic consequences for an industry will be scrutinized 
closely).  
 218. See supra Part V (discussing the transportation cases wherein the 
Supreme Court deemed regulations unduly burdening interstate commerce as 
violative of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).  
 219. See supra Part VI (arguing that certain TNC regulations may run afoul 
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s restriction against unduly commerce-
burdening state regulations). 
 220. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the belief of some 
critics that the doctrine is baseless judicial activism that runs afoul of our 
democratic constitutional theory).   
 221. Courts may be persuaded by the view of some critics that the dormant 
Commerce Clause reverses the deliberate political inertia established by the 
Constitution, and thereby lend little consideration to such challenges. See 
Redish & Nugent, supra note 60, at 573 
Under the dormant commerce clause, the federal judiciary—the organ 
of the federal government most insulated from state influence and the 
organ traditionally feared most by the states—makes the initial 
legislative judgment whether state regulation of interstate commerce 
is reasonable. If the Court strikes down economic regulations, the 
states must somehow force Congress to reverse the decision of the 
Court through legislation—a process made difficult because of 
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Although it is within Congress’s power to preempt all 
problematic commerce-burdening state and city statutes 
regulating TNCs, such a move seems unlikely as the matter of 
TNC regulation is typically viewed as a purely “local issue.”222 
Alternatively, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could take 
action to combat allegedly anticompetitive practices of local taxi 
commissions or TNCs themselves as its power to regulate 
interstate commerce is just as broad as Congress’s.223 It is 
foreseeable that the FTC may become active in TNC regulation 
for other reasons—specifically, by developing uniform regulations 
concerning the privacy and data collection practices of TNCs.224  
The dormant Commerce Clause may also prove to be a useful 
tool in challenging regulations requiring TNCs to communicate 
certain data or information on their webpages and applications to 
consumers in particular jurisdictions.225 Because of the inevitable 
extraterritorial reach of state regulations of Internet webpages, 
they have time and again been held violative of the dormancy 
principle.226 If the burdens posed by various webpage and app 
design and data regulations become overly restrictive and 
                                                                                                     
Congress’s inherent political inertia. Our historical and textual 
analyses lead us to conclude that this is clearly not the plan of the 
Constitution. State power to regulate interstate commerce was 
designed to be determined solely by the political judgment of 
Congress, where the states retain enough political power to block 
congressional action, since Congress's inertia is not against them. 
 222. See Ammori, supra note 5 (arguing that the FTC has the authority and 
legitimacy to regulate in this field).  
 223. See id. (noting that the FTC’s § 5 authority grants it jurisdiction to 
regulate in this arena).  
 224. See Kurt Mueffelmann, Uber’s Privacy Woes Should Serve as a 
Cautionary Tale for All Companies, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2015, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/uber-privacy-woes-cautionary-tale/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2015) (“In fact, the FTC used this power to go after Google and Facebook 
in 2011 for abusing customer information without prior disclosure of these 
practices to consumers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 225. See Michelle Armond, Note, State Internet Regulation and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 379, 379–80 (2002) (noting that 
dormant Commerce Clause may pose as a strong tool for challenges to Internet 
regulations).  
 226. See id. (citing recent prominent cases where internet regulations were 
invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause).  
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unmanageable for TNCs, then they may possibly utilize the 
dormant Commerce Clause to challenge them.227 
This Note does not aim to argue that any and all safety 
concerns offered in efforts to regulate or limit TNC operations are 
unfounded or that invalidation of well-intentioned attempts to 
regulate for these concerns on dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds will somehow take care of them. Genuine safety concerns 
do exist, and the only way to seriously deal with them is to allay 
them through even-handed and constitutional legislation that 
recognizes that TNCs are here to stay, rather than turning a 
blind eye to them or trying to regulate them out of existence. This 
Note maintains that a critical step in achieving a greater balance 
among the wants of consumers, TNCs, and regulators is crafting 
legislation that is both thoughtful and constitutional, to which 
end the potential pitfalls of certain current regulatory schemes 
are illuminated. 
Unless and until there is federal regulation of TNCs, this 
Note concludes that many state regulations currently on the 
books are constitutionally problematic, with surely many more to 
come.228 In efforts to avoid running afoul of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, state and local governments may unwittingly 
realize the benefits and potential that these and other emerging 
app-based technologies have to offer.229 
                                                                                                     
 227. See id. at 385–90 (discussing cases where Internet content providers 
successfully challenged the extraterritorial reach of internet regulations by 
invoking the dormant Commerce Clause).  
 228. See Kellie Mejdrich, Airports Speed Up Plans to Regulate Ride-Sharing 
Apps Like UberX, Lyft, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Jan. 11, 2015), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/airport-647771-companies-state.html (last 
visited on Jan 11, 2015) (pointing out that “the struggle to regulate these 
companies at airports highlights a larger issue: a continually transforming 
transportation landscape,” as there are more such services coming online every 
day). 
 229. See supra Part I (noting various quality of life improvements resulting 
from TNC operations, including the promotion of a sustainable and 
environmentally conscious transportation infrastructure). 
